Containerization is revolutionizing the way that many industries operate, provisioning major impact to modern computing technologies because it is extra lightweight, highly portable, energy, resource and storage efficient, cost-effective, performance efficient, and extremely quick during boot up. These often facilitate efficient load balancing, low-level system maintenance, server consolidation (for efficient energy and resource utilization) and replication of instances over geographical locations for better fault tolerance to escalate application reliability. However, some recent literature have addressed various challenges (such as complex networking, persistent storage facilities, cross data centers and multicloud supports, security issues, and lack of available, capable container management APIs, etc.) regarding successful container adoption in industries, which might have resulted in a seemingly meager increase in industrial deployments of containerization over the past few years despite bestowing efficient lightweight virtualization. Moreover, a comprehensive overview of containerizations along with their popularity dynamics has still not been found in contemporary literature, which further extends knowledge gap between developers and available technologies. Hence, current study touches upon different technicalities involved in containerization with potential problems and possible solutions along with various important industrial applications to manifest its existing supports and technical hardships. Finally, we have conducted a comprehensive experimental study to compare the performance of VMs, containers and unikernels in terms of CPU utilization, memory footprints, network bandwidth, execution time and technological maturity using standard benchmarks and observed containers to deliver satisfactory performance in almost all aspects, however, are still not free from issues regarding isolation & security, performance stability, lack of available efficient tools for crossplatform support and persistent storage. Unikernels deliver good performance with VM-like isolation but still need to achieve desired technical maturity (in terms of microprocessor stability, process containment, persistent storage, etc.). VMs, on the other hand, are found to provide stable performance throughout, though bigger memory footprints and slower spin up/down remain their biggest weaknesses.
platform such that the resources and the guest OSs are unaware that they are residing in a virtualized environment [4] . the OSs thinks it is running on bare metal and does exactly same that it would have done on a bare metal processor like try to execute certain privileged instructions without having right privileges. In full virtualization, the central idea is to run unchanged binaries of the OSs as userlevel processes on the top of the hypervisor. Since the OS code is unchanged, it does not know that it does not have required privileges for executing certain specific instructions. For example, some privileged instructions that require OS to run in privileged or kernel mode on bare metal for their executions, will create a trap that goes into the hypervisor, which will then emulate the intended OS-functionality. This is known as the trap and emulate strategy of full virtualization. This strategy has few problems such as in some architectures, some privileged instructions might fail silently. In order to solve this problem, in fully virtualized system, the hypervisor will resort to binary translation strategy to know the set of instructions that might fail silently in the architecture and ensure that the instructions are carefully dealt with using binary editing strategy. Full virtualization is employed in VMWare. In another approach to conventional virtualization, called paravirtualizations, guest applications are executed in isolated domains and can be identified as guests and issue commands directly to the host OS to fulfill necessary resource requirements. It requires the modification of source codes of the guest OSs for avoiding problematic instructions, including optimization, letting the guest OS to see the real hardware resources underneath the hypervisor, accessing real hardware resources, employing tricks like page coloring and exploiting the characteristics of the underlying hardware. Zen family uses paravirtualization. As can be seen that the conventional virtualization comes at a cost of high resource overheads [3] .
Another approach to virtualization, called container-based virtualization (also known as OS-virtualization, containerization) can be considered as an alternative to conventional virtualization as it potentially reduces resource overhead and thus improves the utilization of datacenters [3] . In containerization, an individual instance (called a container), runs on top of a shared OS kernel (with necessary isolation). A key difference between containerization and hypervisor-based virtualization (using VMs) can be noted; as in containerization, the virtualized objects are mainly limited to global kernel resources, which allows containerization to run multiple virtual environments on top of a common host kernel of an utilizes fewer CPU, memory and networking resources to provide efficient, scalable and cost-effective resource management solutions in cloud infrastructures, which are the main reasons behind its increasing use. More specifically, container management is best done explicitly by a distributed system, rather than simply leaving it to the user to invoke a container from within each task [5] .
Although the recent advancements of virtualization and cloud technologies point to huge number of successful adoptions of containerization in various key industrial applications, the challenges like lack of cross platform supports and container portability limitations, difficult data management and networking during large scale container deployments, unavailability of persistent storage and multicloud supports, lack of efficient tools for container management and orchestration must be addressed with proper care to continue the increasing momentum of containerization in industrial usages in foreseeable future. Moreover, the container isolation mechanism is much weaker compared to that of VM, which also contributes to limiting their widespread industrial applications, since enterprise security people cannot implement various-and often fine-grained-security policies that they are required to abide by Hence, escalation of security and isolation strategies becomes another prime need to continue the increasing momentum of containerization in industrial productions.
Porting containers from one OS family (say Linux) to another (say Windows) is more complex than the porting of VMs. Additionally, a containerized Linux application needs Linux host, which is not necessary for VMs. Also, it is quite hard to get container support for macOS as traditional containerization mainly supports Linux and Windows platforms. Hence, there is no native way available to deploy Dockerized applications on macOS except the relatively costly technique of employing Linux-based VM as middleman between macOS and Dockerized application, which may increase networking conundrum during large scale deployments. This clearly make containers less portable than VMs because of the unavailability of necessary cross-platform supports. Without persistent storage, creating and deleting a large number of containers with workloads, including thousands of tasks in a distributed environment, is often costly significantly high system workloads [6] . This workload can be reduced by sharing containers across multiple tasks at the cost of losing isolation, which increases the chance of a security breach [6] . This sharing of jobs among a large number of containers is managed by different orchestration tools and cluster managers such as Google Borg, Docker Swarm Manager, and Kubernetes [7] . A number of security vulnerabilities are found in many official and community container images (considering all versions) as they have not been regularly updated [8] . These vulnerabilities are mainly propagated from parent image to child and can cause severe security breaches. In the absence of automated and systematic methods of applying security updates, containerization might face opposition in industrial usage. Hence, to maintain the current thrust of industrial usages of containerizations in foreseeable future, there is an urgent need to analyze containerization benefits and weaknesses along with several underlying technicalities. Following are the contributions of the present work:
Performed a detailed study of recent advances of various aspects of containerization such as, container networking; container security & isolation; container cloud and their applications; management & orchestration; and performance analysis.
Discussed various contemporary concepts such as the differences between hypervisor-based virtualization and containerizations, Linux kernel supports for containers (cgroups and namespace), application vs machine containers, different key enabling technologies (such as container management and orchestration, container networking, security & isolation, different advanced Linux security modules) and key industrial container applications.
Discussed different research challenges and future trends of lightweight virtualization.
Performed experiments to compare several aspects of containerization with that of VMs and unikernels.
Before going to the detailed study, it would be apt to briefly touch upon the outline of the current work that include research background & recent literature (Section II), difference from hardware-based virtualization (Section III and Section IV), different key enabling container technologies (in Section V), container security and isolation (in Section VI), key container applications in industries (Section VII), research challenges and future trends (in Section VIII), a number of real-time experiments are conducted with well-known benchmarks (Section IX) for showing near real-time performance, easy software deployment, security & isolation of modern containerization. Finally, the key findings are presented in the conclusion (Section X).
II. RECENT RELATED LITERATURE
Over the past few years, with the increasing popularity of containerization, considerable been conducted on aspects of containerization that can be broadly classified into the following categories.
A. CONTAINER NETWORKING, MIGRATION, CONTAINER CLOUDS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
Container-based clouds have recently gained momentum in various industrial applications, although they must deal with several complex challenges regarding networking and configuration from both customers and providers, when deployed in an existing cloud system [12] . Thus, providers often need to install additional proxy servers and Network Address Translation (NAT), while customers need to use subdomain names and randomly assigned port numbers to access specific services [12] . Moreover, containers running within a single VM (provides better CPU utilization [14] ) are often addressed by specific subdomain names instead of a public IP, and applications on containers are assigned with random TCP/UDP ports rather than the regular ports used by the applications. Although this strategy enables containers to function like network servers, it has several limitations, which makes configuration and management of containerbased clouds relatively difficult and confusing. To reduce this confusion, Kim et al. [12] suggested assigning public IP addresses and port number to application running in a container, where the applications can open TCP/UDP ports regardless of other tenants residing on the same host. However, the difficulties escalate with the application size, where network topology and routing algorithms are two key parameters for communication performance evaluation [13] . Network topology becomes fixed after application deployment and might force static/dynamic routing protocols to penalize performance. Hence, the developers need to understand the optimal network configuration for distinct communication patterns apriori and FlexTuner [13] is one such tool that allows developers to analyze communication cost of their application and find a suitable network topology along with routing algorithm. Although this study did not consider all available network topologies, it can still be successfully used on a limited scope with some fundamental network topologies. Network performance (throughput) of hypervisor based virtualization (preferably, Xen) is often degrades because of additional complexities during transmitting and receiving packets on long data transmission paths between the guest and hypervisor [9] . In contrast, Varma et al. [14] reported that an increase in the number of containers (or cluster nodes) sharing the same CPU (or in a VM) may have a negative impact on network I/O throughput due to the increase in context switch latency (latency in storing/restoring the state of a process, for halting/resuming any execution at/from point of time), thereby creating a bottleneck in big data environments. IBM mitigated networking issue such as scarcity of IP addresses while building their container cloud service, by using shared routers between multiple tenants [17] .
Docker is considered an excellent tool for wrapping existing single-tenant applications and run them as multitenant applications, but the question remains as to how to migrate legacy applications and run them as multicloud services using Docker containers. Skysport uses containers to deploy and execute scientific workflows in a cloud platform but is not designed to be a cloud service. Hence, multitenancy, security and isolation are not of its prime requirements. Additionally, Skyport does not discuss various issues regarding migration of legacy applications to the cloud. Hence, there is a need to develop legacy application migration mechanisms and a reusable architectural pattern for migrating legacy web applications to multitenant, elastic and highly available cloud service using Docker and Cloudant persistence layers was presented in the work [11] , which shows the applicability of containerization in various legacy code migration applications [11] .
Workflows are widely used abstraction for representing large scientific applications and executing them on distributed systems such as clusters, clouds, and grids. Several tasks within a workflow might need different environments for execution, which remain mostly unknown apriori, and hence, during migration to another system, migration is highly likely to fail due to differences in the OS, installed applications, available data, and other dependencies [6] . In their work, Zheng et al. [6] integrated container technology into an existing workflow system because of the advantage of containerization in providing a well-defined execution environment at the OS-level and analyzed the tread-offs between performance, isolation and consistency. Experimental results show that the large overhead due to thousands of tasks, launching and destroying numerous containers can be efficiently handled by sharing containers across multiple tasks in the cost of losing precious isolation. Management of containers is best done explicitly by a distributed system with a microservice architecture, rather than a traditional monolithic software structure (all components of the software run as a single process) [41] . In a simple scenario, a monolithic structure has several advantages, such as easy deployment and networking, which, become harder with complex system requirements and high demand. For example, changes in one component can influence seemingly unrelated areas of the application supporting monolithic architecture that increases the possibility of system failures.
Microservice architecture, supported by containerization, can reduce the complexity of monoliths with more flexible distributed systems of lightweight, narrowly focused and independent services (written in different languages and tools), which use RPC, TCP or HTTP to communicate with each other, and update and scale of components. Although microservice architecture can resolve various drawbacks of monolithic systems, and can also introduce some new challenges, such as the ''service discovery'' problem, ''complex deployment'' and ''log aggregation'' [41] . Deployment and log aggregation can be handled with the necessary expertise and available cluster manager tools such as Google's Borg System and Kubernetes, which can run hundreds of thousands of jobs from many thousands of different applications, across a number of clusters each up to tens of thousands of machines [7] . In contrast, service discovery problems often become much harder to solve. The problems occur because service over a complex networking layer cannot be counted on to be present at a given moment, and hence, the consumer service needs a real-time mechanism to locate the provider service. A number of service discovery mechanisms have been designed to address this issue, of which, Consul [41] bundles service discovery with strongly consistent key-value stores, robust monitoring and health checking. Consul relies on a central set of agents running in server mode in each data center to maintain the cluster state and stops working unless the central agent is unable to form a quorum. Consul's raft-based [44] quorum of server nodes can provide strong consistency. Synapse [41] is another tool for service discovery and management that relies on Docker, AWS EC2 and Zookeeper. CoreOS [41] provides a service directory as a basis of their OS through a distributed, consistent key-value store or shared configuration and service discovery service, called etcd [41] .
SaaS providers are faced with the increasingly relevant but nontrivial question of whether the container technology can play a vital architectural role in the development and operation of multitenant SaaS applications [27] . The popular shared-everything multitenant architecture is more cost-efficient than containers for much weaker security isolation between tenants. Multitenant SaaS applications typically rely on complex application-level middleware services for performance isolation [45] , tenant data management deployments [47] . In principle, it is possible to simplify these middleware services by shifting some functionality to a container orchestration layer. However, container orchestration middleware has some hard pen challenges such as unified configuration management and automated management of service dependencies [48] . In summary, there does not exist a simple answer to whether container technology supports a strengthening or weakening of multitenant SaaS architectures. Truyen et al. [27] presented an in-depth analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) of a container-based architecture for multi-tenant SaaS applications, where the strengths are because of Resilience (automated volume migration from failed PoD to a newly started PoD have significantly reduced data synchronization time), Elasticity (amount of PoDs behind service can easily be scaled), Dynamic Reconfiguration (up and downgrading a service to a newer version becomes simple), Cloud Portability (supporting exampled are, Docker, which can run on any Linux-family OS; Kubernetes is offered as a service by several cloud providers, etc.); Weakness is mainly because of poor security and isolation; Opportunities are due to configurable security isolation between tenants and simplified performance isolation; and Threats are due to increased management complexity. Other container cloud applications include cloud architecture for real-time full motion video target tracking [20] , and distributed systems of microservices using Docker containers [41] . Different technical hardships, involved in container networking, are covered in detail later.
B. CONTAINER ISOLATION & SECURITY
Isolation & security are often considered prime requirements in containerization, otherwise a compromised container might affect other colocated container instances on the same host [5] , [16] , [17] . Moreover, by subverting the Linux kernel, adversaries can take over all containers residing on the same host (known as a single point of failure). Container isolation enables protection of container-specific information from unwanted leakage for maintaining userprivacy (see Section VI). Soltesz et al. [15] provided insights into resource, security and fault isolations for avoiding crosstalk, unwanted snooping and fault propagation between containerized systems, although container usage for provisioning security isolation may not seem propitious [1] , [16] . Xavier et al. [9] also found container inability to provide the desired isolation during the execution of high diskintensive workloads and proposed the consolidation of different workloads as a possible solution. Gerlach et al. [10] used Docker for isolation to mitigate issues relating resource utilization, research method reusability, software deployment, software version, and software compatibility, which could escalate difficulties while reproducing computing environments (to obtain identical results). In another work regarding reusable architecture for migrating legacy web applications to clouds, Slominski et al. [11] designed a workflow service architecture that supports multiple tenants consuming minimal resources. Tenant isolation was implemented using separate databases protected with tenant-specific credentials.
In general, container protection methods are broadly classified into two categories called userspace isolation or hostbased intrusion detection and kernel security hardening mechanisms (using Seccomp, AppArmor, SELinux). However, applying both mechanisms to container environments is not straightforward for several reasons. First, there are limitations in properly deploying them in container environments where part of the workload is executed on the host and part inside the container, in which case multiple processes and applications should be grouped and protected together. Second, their practical application to noisy container environments is not straightforward. Docker's security relies on three components called: (i) process isolation at the userspace managed by the Docker daemon; (ii) enforcement of this isolation by a kernel; and (iii) network operation security. The Docker container relies on Linux kernel features, including namespace (enabled, by default) and, cgroup (not by default, but must be enabled on a per-container basis). The Docker file-system leverages the copy-on-write mechanism, and all containers can share a basic file system image. Writing data to the file-system and, guiding it to write to the associated file, this mechanism can not only significantly reduce the consumption of resources in modifying the data of the container, but also effectively ensure data isolation between containers [42] .
Default Linux isolation is relatively strict; however, it is not secured in front of ARP poisoning as colocated container instances share the same network bridge Combe et al. [16] . The kernel enforces this security mechanism along with with kernel security modules such as Seccomp, Apparmor and SELinux. Docker uses network resources for image distribution, controlling the Docker daemon, downloading images from remote repository that are verified with a hash and a connection to the registry made over TLS [16] , where content trust relies on the update framework. In an interesting study, Shu et al. [8] have investigated the state of security of 356,218 images downloaded from both official and community Docker Hub images and concluded with three important points: (i) both official and community images contain 180 vulnerabilities, while considering all versions; (ii) many of the images have not been updated for approximately 100 days; and (iii) vulnerabilities generally propagate from parent to child images. Hence, there is a strong need for more automated and systematic methods for applying security updates to Docker images.
C. CONTAINER MANAGEMENT & ORCHESTRATION
Cloud and data center employ orchestration frameworks to manage resources (at software and hardware layer) required by the applications; deploy a set of virtualized services in order quality objectives of both users and service providers [49] . Orchestration frameworks manage resource allocation of VMs and containers by exploiting the resource provisioning parameters provided by underlying platforms (hypervisors and OS). Compared to hypervisors, containers can provide both physical (CPU, memory, etc.) and OS-level (CPU scheduling, swapping, etc.) resources [50] . Moreover, containers possess multiple options to allocate a specific resource (e.g. CPU-shares and CPU-sets [50] ). The key feature of management frameworks is to launch applications with the lowest possible latency. Apart from this, management and orchestration frameworks must provide policies for application placement (placing applications on the physical hosts with available required resources) providing the best suitable consolidation [50] . Li et al. [18] identified the necessity of a flexible and efficient framework for resource management in a container-based cloud environment and designed a REST service framework named the Resource-Oriented Network (RON) to decouple resource representation, control and data planes offering fine-grained resources for processes, tasks, containers, clusters, etc., by encapsulating Linux resource control models. Access to RON was secured by employing the RBAC [51] policy. Later, Baresi et al. [52] incorporated a MAPE (Monitor, Analyze, Plan, Execute)based approach to allocating and auto-scaling CPU cores to running applications in containers as well as allocating a fixed amount of memory per core using a discrete-time feedback controller. Furthermore, Baresi et al. [19] presented a MicroCloud architecture that can provide fine-grained, dynamically adaptive, multi-level and topology-aware resource allocation to multiple applications running inside the containers. Other related noteworthy literature is listed in Table 1 .
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND OTHER EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS
Hypervisor-based virtualization is mostly avoided in creating traditional high performance computing clusters as they often cannot attain the same performance obtained in nonvirtualized setups due to their inherent performance overhead [9] , [59] , whereas containerization [15] is considered to be a more effective alternative that might provide near real-time performance in terms of cost-management, performance isolation, checkpoint and live-migration. To corroborate, in [9] , the authors conducted experiments to effectively compare current container technologies both in terms of performance and manageability, while running on MapReduce clusters and found that all container technologies can provide near real-time performance. However, among them, LXC was found to offer the best relation between performance and management capabilities (especially performance isolation). People might argue about the performance of LXC, but still, the overall result looks corroborating to enriching the popularity of the containerization, especially, for MapReduce clusters. Again, containerization is better suited for the scenarios, where the requirement is system virtualization with a high degree of efficiency and good isolation; examples include HPC clusters, grid, hosting centers, and PlanetLab [15] . VMs can provide stronger isolation but are also less efficient than containers. Hence, containerization might often be found to be a better and more accepted alternative.
Container networks play very important role in the container life-cycle system [37] . The works [36] and [37] have investigated the current development of mainstream container models and network solutions such as, Flannel, Docker Swarm Overlay and Calico. They found that Calico (BGP based implementation using three routing layers) has a complicated configuration but shows high performance and very similar TCP throughput as the host because Calico uses data center network structure during network deployment; hence, there is no need to rely on independent network equipment, which makes transfer efficiency higher than its competitors. Calico maintains a separate IP address for individual containers, which makes its routing table relatively large with less mobility support. However, Flannel (network planning service for Kubernetes) has relatively simpler deployment and configuration, but its performance is not satisfactory for various industrial applications because Flannel treats each container with a separate subnet architecture and does not allow fixed IP container drift, which makes it more usable for container clusters with low requirements for flexibility. Docker Swarm Overlay is more suitable for simple network construction because of Overlay's dependence on VxLAN for cross-host communication with encapsulation and decapsulation that penalize with Overlay's poor network performance [37] .
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) has been popularized with VM implementation, although there are several shortcomings, such as hardware virtualization, which incurs considerable performance and efficiency costs; heterogeneous packaging and virtualization platforms may result in fragmented distribution and complex orchestration; VM images are often large and require significant time for deployment and stateful migration among hosts; network I/O may also suffer from various configurations. Some of these problems can be avoided using OS-level virtualization because applications in containers run on the host OS without indirection of underlying hardware, which allows them to run more efficiently than their VM counterparts and allow higher application density on the host; Docker's novel packaging might remove some of the hosting variability requirements for Virtual Network Functions (NFVs); containers do not require packaging OS in their images, which require less disk space and deployment time [38] . Due to the availability of most of the above facilities, Docker becomes a natural fit for NFV. Experimental results of [38] found Docker has lower network latency cost and lower variability than equivalent Xen VMs running on the same software.
III. HYPERVISOR VS CONTAINER-BASED VIRTUALIZATION
Hypervisor-based virtualization and containerization are two most commonly used techniques for server abstraction and efficient resource utilization in data center environments [50] . Hypervisor-based virtualization involves running a hypervisor for sharing virtualized server resources among multiple VMs [1] , whereas containerization involves OS resource virtualization using daemon or container engine.
A. HYPERVISOR-BASED VIRTUALIZATION
It is carried out at hardware-level by virtually distributing physical resources (using a software layer, called hypervisor or VMM, placed between OS and hardware) among multiple co-located VMs running parallel. Hypervisors can be of two categories, type-I (bare metal) and type-II (hosted hypervisor). Type-I (Xen) is placed directly on top of hardware, whereas, in type-II, an underlying OS that runs above hardware (e.g., kvm). Thus, type-I performs better as it avoids an additional OS layer, though usage of type-I and type-II are mainly need driven. Hypervisor-based virtualization [60] offers following (see Table 2 ):
Performance Isolation: Resource consumption and failure of one VM must not affect other co-located VMs.
Server Consolidation: Supports consolidating many under-utilized servers to single machine for significantly reducing energy usage to 90% (major 5G support) [61] .
Live-Migration: Supports live-migration of VMs from one physical host to other for providing better fault tolerance, load balancing, resource allocation, high availability, disaster management, failure recovery and efficient system scaling. Migration Migration might seem redundant for stateless containerized applications, but necessary for implementations like databases, message broker, statecoordination services, etc., [15] .
How containers implement live-migration? Containers implement live-migration using Checkpointing and Restart features (implemented as loadable kernel modules along with the set of userspace utilities) such as checkpointing running container state and restart it later on the same or a different physical host, in a way transparent for running applications and network connections [62] . Checkpointing is done in three stages [62] , called freeze container processes (move process to previously known state and disable network); dump container (collect and save complete state of all container processes as well as container to a dump file); stop container (kill all processes and unmount container filesystem), whereas Restart (on same or other hosts) requires restart container (create a container with the same state saved in dump file); restart process (create all processes within container in frozen state and restore all of their resources from dump file); and resume container (resume process execution and enable networks and next, container continues with normal execution). Container live-migration implemented using checkpointing and restart is described in following steps [62] :
x Transfer container file-system to destination server (file-system synchronization); y Freeze all the processes and disable networking; z Collect all resources and dump them to a disk file; { Since container is still running on source and hence, dirty pages are continuously generated, which motivates the second time container file synchronization; the destination; } Restart container at the destination;
Resume container execution at destination; Stop container at source; Destroy container at source. To the best of our knowledge, Voyager [63] is a file-system-agnostic and vendor-agnostic consistent live container migration service designed following Open Container Initiative (OCI) principles.
Replication: Supports VM replication over geographic locations as proactive measure of fault-tolerance.
Containerizations provide above features with less memory and time footprints. VMs are often found providing better security & isolation due to hardware level partitioning and abstraction, whereas, containers provide OS-level abstractions. Container security can be enhanced using various security mechanisms discussed later.
B. CONTAINERIZATION ( ): TYPES & SUPPORTS
In hypervisor-based virtualization, each VM runs separate OS, and applications on top (see Fig. 1 ). On contrary, containerizations (termed as type-III or type-C hypervisor) virtualizes OS level resources encapsulating standard OS processes along with their dependencies to create containers (with isolated CPUs, memory, block I/Os, and network) that are collectively managed by underlying host OS kernel and can be seen as sandboxes running applications in isolated ways [1] . They do not need init as PID1. Container bundles necessary OS functionality to run a specific application along with the application itself to a unit visible to the host machine, in contrast VMs are opaque. To make it clearer, we explain Fig. 1 using Docker container that allows reproducible building process including Docker files (container files in Fig. 1 ), container image and runtime. It implements central repositories like Docker Hub (Image repository in Fig. 1 ), where developers upload their images, and other alternate registries for building (fetching process from external repositories, see Fig. 1 ) third-party application.
1) LINUX KERNEL SUPPORTS FOR CONTAINERS
Unlike hypervisor-based virtualizations, containers share same OS kernel that removes additional performance overheads. This has given containers a heavy industrial push with few serious security flaws (discussed later) and technical challenges [54] , [55] . Following two are basis of light-weight process virtualization [64] :
Namespace: Namespace has been introduced in Linux kernel 2.4.19 for isolating virtualized resources to a group of processes [64] . Each process can be associated with multiple namespaces of different types. These processes are provided with a customized view of system resources by kernel. Alteration to any namespaced system resource are confined only within related namespace that avoids influences of other namespaces. Six different types of namespaces like mount (MNT), UNIX Timesharing System (UTS), PID, NET, IPC, and USER namespaces are found implemented in modern kernels. MNT namespace isolates a set of filesystem mount points for enabling file-system isolation such that different MNT-namespaces portray different file-system hierarchy views. UTS-namespace allows each container to be treated as an independent node by providing its own host and domain names. PID-namespaces efficiently virtualizes process identifiers such that each process is associated with two PIDs: one associated within process PID-namespace and another associated to host (globally unique). It helps to isolate one process from another in such a way that processes in one container can view only those processes that are having same PID-namespace. NET-namespace [65] , [66] virtualizes network devices, ports, IP addresses, and IP routing tables. IPC-namespace isolates and confines IPC resources (signals, pipes, and shared memory). USER-namespace, introduced in Linux kernel recently, isolates user and group ID number spaces. It maps a root user inside a container with an unprivileged user on host thereby, providing full privileges for a process inside USER-namespace, but deprivileging it on host.
cgroups: In Linux kernel, cgroups provides a mechanism for partitioning groups of processes (along with their children) in hierarchical order with controlled behaviors with the help of cgroupfs mount and /proc/self /cgroup file. cgroups does limiting (management, accounting and tracking) of memory, CPU, block I/O, and network resources for the groups of processes and container instances for barring one instance from eating all host resources. Each cgroup subsystem provides a unified sysfs interface to simplify cgroup operations from user space. LXC, Linux-VServer, OpenVZ, Cells, Docker and LXC use cgroups for resource limiting [54] . Verma et al. [7] have reported that cgroups mechanism needs Linux CPU scheduler for achieving both low latency and high utilization for typical latency-sensitive, user-facing workloads at Google.
In short, cgroup limits amount of system resources for individual container instance, whereas namespace imposes instance-specific resource visibility.
2) APPLICATION CONTAINER VS. MACHINE CONTAINER
Containerization differs VMs as they do not need to include an entire process-supportive separate OS (several GBs in size), other than host OS (for type-II settings) to run hosted applications. However, containers like LXD, OpenVZ, etc., can contain complete file-systems with all normal OS and are named as machine containers. Machine container boots an OS and due to their small sizes, hundreds of containers can reside within a single core. Their performances are similar to bare metal with negligible latencies. On contrary, application containers (like rkt, Docker, etc., however complete OS can also run within a Docker container) run single process, app, or service with negligible latencies and near real-time performance. In short, application containers are better suited if requirement is to package and distribute application as components. On contrary, machine containers are useful while need is to install different libs, languages, apps, etc.
IV. ADVANTAGES OVER VMs
Despite containing many flexible software layers, including full OS image (a Linux or Windows kernel hosting a primary application running in user space, along with concurrently running secondary services), most deployed VMs ultimately perform a single function such as acting as a database or Web server that need only a part of OS for execution [67] . Unlike VMs, container hosting single application, only needs dependencies (packages, libs, bins and storages) necessary for application execution [50] in isolated memory, network and storage spaces [19] . Hence, containers are considered as more compact single purpose appliances than VMs. Many recent industrial surveys (conducted over 400 organizations) [68] , [69] reported extreme light-weightness (Just Enough OS for running single application [70] ) and faster spin up/down as main containerization advantages over VMs. Following are few specific benefits of modern containerization:
Reducing intra and inter-datacenter storages and traffics by replacing VMs with evenly distributed containers [1] , [71] .
Energy efficiency, resource utilization, application reliability escalation, and service cost reduction are achieved using containerization in datacenters [50] . Containerization allows cloud users [72] to see current versions of running application code and related dependencies, which enable them to look for differences between container editions and rolling-back to earlier version as and when needed.
Container spin-up/down needs only few milliseconds, whereas VM needs few seconds for booting [1] .
Containers use soft limits for resource allocation (depending on resource availability) that enable hosted applications to use resources beyond pre-defined limits [50] . On contrary, dynamic increasing of resource limits are relatively harder for VMs. Soft limits serve well during overcommitment and perform efficient resource utilization.
Containerization increases developer efficiency, supports microservice architectures, enables apps to run on multiple cloud platforms, etc., [6] .
Containerization provides better storage utilization (with low storage footprint [73] ) as we need less space for keeping multiple copies of specific container in datacenter network that leads to efficient proactive fault tolerance [71] .
During low-level system maintenance, we need to migrate only application container that runs desired application with necessary dependencies (very small size). On contrary, in case of VM, we need to migrate heavier VMs containing full OS with applications on its top.
Providing much light-weight, faster process execution platforms [63] with a thin layer of necessary libs and bins for the application execution along with application code and supporting packages [1] .
Potential to develop, test and deploy applications to single or multiple of servers. Containers can also be inter-connected.
In short, hypervisor-based systems are well-suited for applications residing on same cloud requiring separate OS and hence, physical level abstractions are needed to distribute physical resources. On contrary, containers share host resources by running trimmed OS image with root file-system and necessary dependencies, which make them extremely light-weight and easily deployable to any hosts [15] . In spite of having several flexible layers, deployed VMs mostly perform single function that need only parts of OS for execution and hence, resulting in shear resource wastage, prolonged execution time and increased operation cost. This can be controlled using containers [67] .
V. KEY ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES A. KEY CONTAINER TECHNOLOGIES
A number of container technologies (see Table 3 ) are found in industrial applications are as follows: Linux-VServer, an oldest Linux container, implements isolation by employing mechanisms like kernel patch (changes between different versions of a source tree), installation of userland tools (various programs and libs that OS uses to interact with kernel: software performing input/output, manipulates file-system objects, application software, etc.), standard ''chroot()'' system call and POSIX capabilities (increases overall security) [74] .
Unlike Linux-VServer, OpenVZ is placed above kernel namespaces to isolate all the resource subsets and consists of several user-level tools for virtualization, isolation, checkpointing and resource management. Similar to OpenVZ, LXC [75] provides container isolation by employing kernel namespaces and manages resources using cgroups and blkio. LXC can be further classified as privileged containers (container's UID 0 is mapped to the host's UID 0) providing secured access through MAC (like SELinux, AppArmor, Scecomp, etc.) and unprivileged containers (UID 0 is mapped to an unprivileged user other than UID 0 on host) where above mentioned security measures are not mandatory.
Docker containers are extension to LXC, which implement faster deployment of Linux applications, make use of namespaces and cgroups to isolate and manage underlying operating environment and also include kernel-and application-level API, Docker to provide a better container isolation. rkt, another application container engine designed for state-of-the-art cloud-native production environments, is based on PrOcess Domain Abstraction (POD), which is a collection of one or more applications or Application Container Images (ACIs) executed using shared resources. Resource isolation is provided at both PODlevel and per-application level. Unlike Docker, which runs under PID namespace of Docker daemon, rkt gets executed under init system like upstart or systemd which facilitates running multiple processes inside a single container as opposed to Docker which runs a single process inside a container. rkt is more security focused and has support for Docker images and kvm. rkt fetches container images as non-root (important for security purpose); uses VM based isolation at stage 1 and supports Svirt in addition to default SELinux policy.
Apart from Linux, FreeBSD introduced containerization called Jail that can mitigate security related issues by partitioning a FreeBSD environment (partitioning root with processes, file-system, network resources) into a management environment, and on demand subset of Jail environments (having limited root access but privileged containers) rather than offering fine-grained access control techniques, simultaneously maintaining the existing UNIX security model. This enables partition of FreeBSD machine into independent and isolated jails as well as creation of multiple users and a privileged user (root) in each jail. Solaris developed Zones to provide OS and hardware level abstractions to isolate applications from PM in terms of applications, device paths, network interface names, etc. Zap provides a virtualization layer on top of OS using PODs [76] . Process and file-system isolations are achieved using PID-namespace, IPC keys and IPC IDs. Cells is used as a virtual mobile smart-phone architecture enabling multiple virtual smartphones to run simultaneously on same physical cellphone in an isolated, and secure manner [77] . Cells [77] , [78] implements isolation using kernel namespaces, cgroup and chroot().
B. CONTAINER MANAGEMENT & ORCHESTRATION
Container management strategy not only simplifies administrative workload of creating, deleting, deploying, configuring and scaling of large number of containers on host, but also automate deployment of container-based application to various heterogeneous infrastructures with increased interoperability [1] , [79] . Noteworthy features of container management tools are:
Managing multiple containers as one single entity, efficient container organization, sensible launch and replication of container instances over geographical locations for fault-tolerance.
Efficient cluster formation for maintaining high availability, better resource utilization, load-balancing, automatic data backup and disaster recovery.
Scheduling container execution for better resource utilization.
Good orchestration tool should do Container autoscaling that automatically change the number of running containers, based on CPU utilization or other applicationprovided metrics. Kubernetes uses Autoscalar for deployment and Kubernetes 1.2 adds alpha support for scaling containers.
Volume management should be done for controlling persistent storage. Kubernetes provides different types of volumes, each of which is implemented as a plugin. Current plugins include Google Cloud Platform volume, AWS Elastic Block Storage volume, Ceph block device, Empty dir (backed on the node where the PoD runs, thus it just leverages local storage from that node; it exists on that node until the PoD is removed).
Resource usage monitoring (CPU and RAM) is required at different levels like container level and logical group level (for example, Kubernetes PoDs) and at the cluster level.
Automatic reporting of issues found in container orchestration and production. It requires a strict monitoring mechanism that includes few core capabilities like ability to gather detailed data and analyze it to spot possible future failures; ability for taking automatic action.
Service discovery module should be a part of good orchestration tool. Kubernetes supports two primary modes of finding a service through environment variables and DNS.
Rolling system updates should be allowed by a good orchestration tool. Kubernetes An important conceptual difference between orchestration and service discovery problem (discussed in Section II-A) is that former implies the process of deploying, monitoring and dynamically controlling the configuration of multi-container packaged application in the container cloud, whereas service discovery problem occurs because services cannot be counted on at a given moment and the consumer service needs to locate the provider service for successful execution [41] .
C. CONTAINER NETWORKING
Microservices running on containers heavily rely on underlying networking resources for service provisioning as well as communications between different microservices (or inter-container communication, since each microservice runs on individual container) [80] . However, providing reliable networking infrastructure from container perspective is done as follows:
Fully isolated networking view for applications running within containers [80] : It is provided by UNIX Time Sharing (UTS) and network namespaces by enabling isolated network interfaces, routing table, IP tables, loopback device, forwarding rules along with kernel modules like veth, ipvlan and MACVLAN, thereby allowing containers to act as an independent system [80] , [81] .
Discovering and addressing for replicated containers throughout their life-cycle specifically in clustered environment [80] : Container clusters are typically a bunch of tightly coupled containers deployed on same PM, sharing same resources and generally placed inside same network namespace for enabling inter-cluster communication via local host. Container clusters provide a persistent network even if individual containers in cluster are scaled up/down, restarted, created/destroyed. Persistence network can be achieved by assigning an IP per cluster or using dynamic port allocation and mapping.
Container network design is also influenced by number of host machines required to deploy applications and can be classified as single host container networking (categorized in several modes like bridge, host, container and no networking) and multi-host container networking [82] that considers connections between container/host and inter host as well as its performance and security. It makes use of overlay networks (creating a distributed network across hosts on top of host-specific network) as well as network plug-ins for third-party providers. Number of popular multi-host container networking options are Flannel, Calico, Canal, OpenVPN, and Open vSwitch (OVS) [82] . Container network provisioning and management can also be optimized by adopting Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm [83] , [84] . SDN capability can be fully leveraged by using OVS [83] , where several containers on a host can be connected to OVS bridges that can be connected to other OVS bridges residing on different hosts. SDN controllers like OpenDaylight (ODL) or Open Network Operating System (ONOS) can be employed to visualize, and manage OVS switches [83] .
VI. CONTAINER SECURITY ISOLATION
Container security problems start with sharing common host kernel among different instances without installing proper security and isolation mechanisms, whereas, VMs run on separate kernels and hence, considered as more secured option [1] . Containers running on the top same host OS significantly expand the attack surface in comparison with VMs. For example: privilege containers have the root access to the host OS and hence the attackers can evade the privacy of host OS and collocated containers. Hence, in many cases, cloud providers offer containers running inside VMs because of VMs' stronger security assurance toward protecting data center assets against external customer code. Apart from that, in multi-user environment, where multiple user can deploy containers and able to run malicious codes hidden inside container images downloaded from official or public repositories. Sometime, container images downloaded from official repositories are not updated for several days and may contain vulnerabilities. Moreover, vulnerabilities mainly propagate from parent images to children images. Direct adversary is able to sniff, inject malicious code snippets, block or modify access privilege and network system configuration of the in-production containers (by gaining root privilege on a container and them making DoS to other collocated containers), in-production host OS by gaining access to the critical host files from a compromised container), and in-production Docker daemons (by lowering default security parameters necessary for Docker containers from a compromised OS) and the production network (redirecting network traffic from a compromised host OS). However, an indirect adversary has the same capabilities but uses Docker ecosystem to reach the production environment. Hence, Docker's default configuration on local systems following recommended usages (microservices approach, i.e., container must host only one service) has been found relatively more secured due to its limited communication between container and host, which provides better isolation [16] . With wide-spread usage (shipping complete virtual environment with a container), Docker becomes more attack prone. Moreover, Docker image from an untrusted repository increases vulnerability in manifolds.
The success of application containers can be partly attributed to their ability to share resources with the underlying host. However, in the absence of strict isolation mechanism, the characteristics that have contributed to the success of application containers can also be seen as factors limiting their possibility of widespread industrial adoption, since enterprise IT administrators cannot implement the variousand often finegrained-security policies they are required to abide by. Hence, containerization needs robust isolation mechanism installed within to defend against various adversarial activities and to maintain its exponential growth in various industrial applications [5] , [54] , [85] . Let C i ; i ∈ N be individual container; C andC be container classes controlled by legitimate users and adversaries respectively such that if C i ∈ C then C i / ∈C and vice versa.
A. PROCESS ISOLATION
Process isolation aims to isolate various processes running within different containers on same (or different) host such that C i ∈C (⊂ C) does not influence C k ∈ C (⊂ C) using signals and interrupts. Moreover, process isolation can successfully restrict information duplication whilst process and container need similar information. However, often memory of a process running in C k ∈ C can directly be accesses by a debugger process using ptrace()-type system calls. Containers implement process isolation using PID namespace, chroot, etc. [65] . LXC/LXD implements process isolation using chroot that can change the working root directory of a process and its sub-processes. Entire root file-system can be copied to a new location using pivot_root. Pivot_root facilitates users in specifying old and new root directories; copying files from old root to new root directory; and lastly, making new root directory as current root. LXC and cells also use PID-namespaces, mainly a part of mainline Linux kernel, to implement process isolation. PID-namespace is a strategy to group processes for controlling their ability to see (like via proc pseudo-file-system) and interact (like sending signals) among themselves. PID-namespaces also provide PID virtualization that enables two processes in different PID-namespaces to having same PID. PID-namespace allows each container to have its own init-like process (with PID 1) that can cause all processes within a namespace to be discontinued if it is terminated. Process with PID 1 assists admins in completely shutting down a container upon detecting any adversarial activity.
Docker implements process isolation using process wrapping within related namespace and limiting their visibility to the processes running in other containers or hosts [54] . This is achieved using PID-namespace that separates the host PID space from that of container. Since, structures of PID-namespaces are hierarchical, a process can only see other processes within own namespace or ''children'' namespaces. If a new namespace is created and assigned to a container, host can observe and affect processes inside new PID-namespace of the container, but processes inside container cannot observe or do anything to other processes running in host or in other containers. Hence, it will be harder for attackers as they have very little understanding/reach about other processes running in other containers located in same or different hosts.
Maintaining a separate structure that describes a container and storing a pointer to that container in process task structure are found to be implemented in FreeBSD Jails, Solaris Zones, OpenVZ and Linux-VServer for process isolation [85] . On contrary, upstream Linux kernel has observed a bit different approach of grouping various kernel resources (kernel structure referring to shared physical/virtual devices, system resources like CPU, memory, etc.) into independent namespaces and utilizing these namespaces to build containers. This approach increases complexity, but provides flexibility to choose a combination of namespaces that fits appropriately for desired use case. It also facilitates gradual introduction of namespaces to an existing system, similar to upstream Linux kernel, which also aids in testing and verification of implementation [65] .
In addition to ability of virtualizing and isolating PIDs, upstream Linux kernel also capable to virtualize and isolate user and group identifiers by means of user namespaces. Typically, root user possesses all privileges to handle different system administration tasks and has ability to override all access control restrictions. However, containers should run as non-root. Therefore, implementing Linux user namespace implies a given Linux capability like authorizing an action, within that namespace: for example, CAP_SYS_BOOT capability within a container allows authority to reboot that specific container and not host. On contrary, capabilities like CAP_SYS_MODULE cannot be granted safely for a container in any meaningful manner. When a particular process tries to execute an action guarded by such capability, kernel always verifies whether that process possesses this capability in host user namespace. All existing Linux containerization solutions support an option of initiating new user namespace for each container, but requires manual configuration like user identifiers mapping between host and container.
B. FILE-SYSTEM ISOLATION
It protects benign containers (C k ∈ C) form being compromised by malicious containers (C i ∈C) by keeping C k indifferent from C i file-systems [85] . Another aspect of file-system isolation is isolating file-system among various co-located containers that, in turn, minimizes amount of shared data. Amount of sharing often remain scenariospecific like duplicating complete OS setup within containers may not often be cost effective and against container-usage perspective [64] . Hence, container needs to securely share some parts of host file-system for which file-system isolation becomes a must.
Linux containerizations use mount namespace (inspired by private namespace [86] ) for file-system isolation by separating mounts between host and container [54] . Following this Linux systems create containers within new mount namespaces and internal mount events become active within specific containers. It restricts all mount events within a container to influence other events in different co-located containers, thus provide isolation. Precisely speaking, mount namespaces should not be viewed as an extra security addon as containers already inherit file-system mount from their parents and hence, can directly view parent file-systems. This can cause a serious security threat in presence of co-located compromised container. Docker mitigates this issue by removing write permission to mentioned file-systems from containers, and restricting all containers processes to re-mounting any file-system within containers by removing CAP_ SYS_ADMIN privilege from containers [87] . Above all, Docker employs copy-on-write file-system that restricts other containers, created on the same image, to modify any specific container file-system. Among other popular ways for achieving file-system isolation; chroot() alone has been found to be implemented in Cells, whereas, Linux-VServer uses Secure chroot barrier for achieving the same [88] . FreeBSD Jails and Solaris Zone use chroot() like system calls that eliminate above security threats by allowing different allow.mount options or by restricting container internal processes from mounting/ un-mounting file-systems within container [89] , [90] .
LXC mounts copy-on-write current host file-system. System's /home directory is not imported in LXC container by default and, hence, any modification to container file-system will only stay within container. Consequently, host file-system remains unaffected. This feature helps LXC container to potentially isolate malicious processes from host like installing (apt-get) software packages (will not be installed in container because of imposed file-system isolation), chroot system for running servers, etc. LXC also uses pivot_root() that is mainly, used while booting to changing the mount-point from a temporary root filesystem to older root. It can also move mount-point from an old root to a directory under new root file-system. Older root file-system can be unmounted, while mounting within a namespace that provides container-specific file-system isolation.
C. DEVICE ISOLATION
For UNIX family of OS, devices are treated as special security-sensitive files that provide interfaces to host device drivers as inappropriately shared devices may lead to severe security threats. Typical UNIX configuration separates devices from rest of the file-systems and places their inodes in /dev, whereas in Linux, udevd daemon process issues mknod system call upon receiving event from kernel [86] . A strong motivation behind the possible enforcement of device isolation in containerization can be if container has default privilege of using important devices like /dev/mem, /dev/sd * , /dev/tty, /dev/kmem, etc., will lead to serious and sensitive information disclosure. Hence, device isolation must be implemented to maintain container isolation by allowing only ''safe set'' of devices, classified by Reshetova et al. [85] as Purely virtual devices [85] like pseudo-terminals, virtual network interfaces, etc., must be explicitly created for individual containers and must not be shared among containers; Stateless devices [85] are securely shared among containers and hosts due to their stateless nature; User namespace-aware devices [85] can be safely exposed to the containers as they impose namespace specific user restrictions. This is currently not implemented but can be a potential security parameter for foreseeable future. Cells implements device isolation using device namespace. Docker implements device isolation using Device Whitelist Controller feature that limits set of devices connected to a container [54] . Moreover, Docker mounts container images with nodev system call and limited privileges (stops using any device) that restricts an already created device node to communicate with kernel.
D. IPC ISOLATION
IPC can be viewed as a set of rules (conventional SysV IPC primitives like semaphores, shared memory, etc.) defined for sharing inter-process data [85] . IPC isolation is necessary for controlling communications among processes running in containers only through a set of pre-defined IPC resources and restricting processes from modifying data of other co-located containers and host. It prevents C i ∈C to access C k (∈ C)-specific data transmitted over IPC channels.
IPC isolation is implemented in Linux containers (Linux-VServer, LXC, OpenVZ, Docker, and Cells) using container-specific IPC namespace, where process within an IPC namespace is prohibited form reading/writing IPC resources in different IPC-namespace. Cells needs namespace support from Binder system (Android's primary IPC method) for which, IPC namespace-specific context managers are created that resolve Binder address within a specific namespace providing complete Binder address isolation among various containers. Solaris Zones adds Zone ID to each object based on Zone ID of its parent process, and, hence, zone-specific objects remain inaccessible to processes from other zones. Administrator (in global zone) can access objects from other zones. FreeBSD Jails blocks those SysV IPC object-related system calls that are issued from a jail. SysV IPC mechanisms are allowed for jailed processes with the help of allow.sysvipc option, but it does not provide any isolation between jails.
E. NETWORK ISOLATION
It is required to prevent containerization from various network-based attacks. Virtualized view of network stack is often needed for server consolidation and resource management. FreeBSD Jail and Linux-VServer implement network isolation on Layer 3 using bind filtering, which restricts a bind() call from within a container to a set of specified IP addresses as a result of which processes send/receive packets to/from these addresses with minimal performance overhead. Solaris Zones and OpenVZ implements network isolation providing Layer 3 virtualized network interface (VNI) for every individual container. This strategy is a bit more flexible than bind filtering as VNI allows configuration of various traffic control settings. OpenVZ's Layer 3 implementation is named as venet, whereas that for Solaris Zones is termed as shared-IP zone. Docker implements network isolation using network namespace that creates virtual ethernet bridge, called docker0, in the host machine, which automatically forwards packets between network interfaces. Docker establishes a new virtual ethernet interfaces with unique name and connects with the bridge while creating new container. This interface is also connected with container's eth0 interface that enables container to send packets to bridge.
F. RESOURCE LIMITING
Containerization often needs imposing sensible limits on available and allocated physical resources to individual containers for preventing DoS attacks. Several resource limiting strategies are found in containerizations. Docker employs cgroups for controlling various physical resources like CPU, RAM, I/O, devices, etc.; ensuring individual container with desired amount of resources that, in turn, prevents any specific container from devouring all available system resources. In this way, Docker prevents DoS attacks. LXC, Linux-VServer, OpenVZ and Cells also use cgroups mechanism for resource limiting. FreeBSD Jails implements individual jail-resource limiting by employing Hierarchical Resource Limits that defines actions like stopping new resource allocation, signal or notification (SIGHUP, SIGKILL, etc.) sending, etc., while a pre-defined resource limit has been exceeded. Solaris Zones utilizes a resource partitioning technique, termed as resource pools (where a dynamic pool allows resource allocation based on system loads), that allows defining a set of resources like a physical processor set for individual zone. Cells and Linux-VServer implement container resource limiting using rlimits (a conventional resource management technique found in FreeBSD), though, rlimits does not allow users to specify resource limit for individual container. However, custom resource management extensions are found to be implemented in OpenVZ and Linux-VServer.
G. ADVANCED Linux SECURITY MODULES
This subsection talks about different advanced Linux security modules that enhance container security by imposing MAC over traditional Linux and POSIX Access Control Lists' (ACL) DAC [51] implementation (owner or group specific restriction on object access). DAC provides full discretion over all system objects to respective owner by checking/ comparing process UID and GID with that of requested file for read/write/execute. Moreover, in DAC, controls over objects are treated as discretionary that enables a subject with a certain access right to passing permission/right to any other subjects. Hence, complete control over all in-account objects switch to adversaries as and when account gets compromised. Modern Linux kernel implements MAC (security mechanism for restricting individual resource owners ability of granting or denying access to resource objects in a file-system) or policy based access control layer over DAC to add constraints on DAC using following modules:
SELinux: A security architecture that implements MAC over default Linux DAC for controlling object access. DAC provides complete discretion over all system objects to respective owner and hence, control shifts to adversaries as and when the account gets compromised. In contrast, MAC enforces policy-based access and transition rights control to every individual user, application, process and file present in system. SELinux governs these system objects using very complex and flexible security policies (strict or lenient as needed), independent of specific security labels and contents, for providing secure process, file-system, and user SELinux provides clean separation of very complex policy from enforcement with well defined policy interfaces; individual labels and controls for kernel objects and services; caching of access decisions for efficiency; supports for policy changes. controls over various system objects, sockets, messages and network interfaces. It does not require labelling or re-labelling of file-systems and provides control over process initialization, inheritance and program execution. This mechanism is relatively harder to deploy and use.
AppArmor: A path-based Linux kernel security module (enforcing MAC) for binding access control attributes to programs rather users by using two profile (read and audit) modes called enforcement (enforcing defined policies to profile) and complain (reports policy violation attempts). It allows mixing of modes and often has a lower barrier of entry than other popular MAC systems. AppArmor provides easy deployment; supports for YaST-based GUI tools to help development, deployment and maintaining application security policies; protects third party applications from internal and external security threats by enforcing appropriate application behavior. AppArmor supports developers in scheduling detailed event reports and configure alerts based on user defined events. Unlike SELinux, AppArmor attaches labels to all files, processes and objects.
Seccomp: This Linux kernel security module allows process to make an one-way transition into a secure state, where it cannot make any system calls except exit(), sigreturn(), read() and write() to already-open file descriptors (like a system call filter, called Seccomp filter). Seccomp filter allows processes to specify filter for incoming system calls, which reduces total exposed kernel space to specific applications. It blocks some dangerous activities like forced umounts, kexec, kernel module loading and unloading, and open-by-handle-at system call. grsecurity: It is an intelligent and robust RBAC system to generate least privilege policies for utilizing multilayered detection, prevention and containment model. It also deploys chroot hardening; /tmp race prevention, extensive auditing; prevents arbitrary code execution in kernel; does stack, lib and heap randomization; protects processes from exploitable null pointer vulnerabilities; restricts users from viewing others processes. It is very easy to deploy and use
H. FEW BEST PRACTICES FOR MAINTAINING CONTAINER SECURITY
Above security mechanisms are found installed in Linux containerizations. However, user/developer wisdom would often play final role for maintaining container security. Following are few best practices towards comprehensive adoption of container security: Use Trusted Images: Developers often like assembling container images rather than building from scratch. Hence, it is always advisable to use images from trusted repositories.
Container Secret Managing: Container secret should not be exposed to many users and processes and hence, it is advised not to store them on disk or not to expose them to host level. Secrets should only be made accessible to relevant containers during runtime.
Secure the Runtime Environment: Always, use namespace and cgroups for isolating container access and control.
Vulnerability Scanning: Preventing images with known vulnerabilities from running in production environments using trusted and efficient vulnerability scanning tools.
Enabling MAC: It is always advised to enable MAC (by adding different advanced security modules discussed in Section VI-G) over traditional DAC for comprehensive adoption of container security.
Running Containers as Non-Root: Containers must run as non-root for their security escalation.
VII. KEY CONTAINER APPLICATIONS IN INDUSTRIES
Noteworthy industrial container applications are as follows:
Containerization in Gaming: ''Pokemon GO'' was deployed on oogle Cloud Platform using Kubernetes clusters. Since its inception, Niantic targeted 1x traffic with expected 5x traffic at worst case, but actual traffic was nearly 50x. Despite this sudden traffic surge, ''Pokemon GO'' was able to efficiently serve millions of users due to scalability and flexibility of Kubernetes. Kubernetes monitored traffic and adapted itself by creating/destroying containers according to traffic flow fluctuations. Containerbased development, offered better control, faster and huge connections with an exceptional Quality of Experience to users. ''iPokemon'' is deployed using mazon EC2 cloud and LXD containers for distributed and light-weight computation [91] .
Containerization in Healthcare: Possible containerization application could be gateways in Cloud-of-Things (IoTs, Edge Computing, Web of Things) due to its ability of working as an end-point for user data presentation; lightweight and dense service deployment with negligible performance impact [92] , [93] . Dean et al. [94] developed an inexpensive cloud application for processing large protected healthcare data (using Docker for gateways), which enables necessary storage and processing related features. Moreover, healthcare applications should provide facilities like locationawareness and on-the-go provisioning with minimum latency, may be difficult for a single cloud provider. Thus, Palesandro et al. [95] proposed a multi-cloud healthcare system (using LXC) that provides flexible provisioning; optimized resource allocation; inter-operability support; resource abstraction and security. In other works, McPadden et al. [96] and Boonma et al. [97] used containerization for deploying data analytics platforms for analyzing healthcare and biomedical data.
Containerization in Network-Function Virtualization (NFV): NFV [98] is a trending concept where various network functions like routing, switching, firewalls, etc., are virtualized in a software applications to significantly minimize CAPEX and OPEX [99] . Traditional NFV approaches adopted full-fledged VMs which made them extremely heavy and were unable to perform complex tasks [100] . In one variant, Li et al. [100] presented light-weight deployment of deep learning models within NFV containers. Pattaranantakul et al. [99] developed a security orchestrator that enables dynamic generation of access control models and policies for different tenants across different NFV layers and multiple data centers. Tseng et al. [101] amalgamated hypervisor with containerization to construct an integrated virtualization fog platform (for improving service scalability) for industrial application deployment using NFV. In a similar application, Boubendir et al. [102] have developed an on demand dynamic model that implements network as part of NaaS using SDN-enabled NFV. Riggio et al. [103] proposed a multi-access network OS that integrated SDN and NFV in a single light-weight framework to manage and orchestrate network services over distributed NFV architecture.
Containerization in Microservices-Architectures: Microservice consists of multiple independently deployable, scalable and testable (platform and technological stack independent) small services that together constitutes single complex software system [25] , [71] , [104] , [105] . Containers being light-weight and portable are the first choice for implementing microservices architectures [71] , [105] . Containers are capable enough to produce same environment in both production and development thereby curbing conflicts between operations and development teams [104] . Migrating monolithic architectures to microservices provides benefits like adaptability, technology lock-in, reduction in time-to-market and better development of services [104] . For example, Balalaie et al. [104] migrated a monolithic application ''Backtory'' to microservices architecture for providing chat-as-a-service. Service instances were deployed using Docker containers due to its capability to provide lower overheads and produce same environments without changing source codes or container images. Another example can be Netflix that pioneers migration from monolithic to microservices [106] for improving robustness, availability, and scaling. According to Mohamed et al. [21] and Tosatto et al. [49] , the adoption of container technology was influenced by SOA in cloud to manage service life-cycles of deployed applications. Mohamed et al. [21] , introduced a micro-container (container with single deployed service) offering web services.
Containerization in Scientific-Workflows: Scientific workflow requires specific configuration, OS-specific libs and packages that can vary from system to system and may not be replicated in due to external dependencies incompatibility [10] , [49] . Gerlach et al. [10] developed technique using containers for deployment and execution of scientific workflow applications in an isolated, portable and self-contained environment that can be distributed efficiently across a wide range of computing platforms. Zheng and Thain [6] used containerization for providing a well-defined run-time for scientific workflows running in distributed architecture. They have also pointed out possible trade-offs among isolation, performance and consistency.
Containerization in Edge Computing (EC): High latency, network congestion and network bottleneck are considered to be some of the potential problems with cloud computing, for which there is a desperate need of switching from centralized to decentralized paradigm, where edge computing could be a potential solution [73] . EC is the practice of processing data near the edge of network, where the data were generated, instead of in a centralized data processing center. In other words, edge computing promotes distributed open IT architecture, featuring decentralized processing power, enabling mobile computing and IoT. Ismail et al. [73] evaluated Docker as EC platform with four fundamental criteria, called deployment & termination; resource & service management; fault tolerance; and caching.
Proliferation of connected objects in cloud has often been suspected as a reason behind data confidentiality and network performance related issues, for which, fog can be thought of as potential solution. In general, intelligent systems deployed in fog receive requests based on system context and userobjectives and the analytic task is divided into segments that are offloaded to surrogates (fog nodes to offload portions of large analytic jobs) and final results are returned to specific user application [107] . Context manager node monitors surrogates' status and provides context information to other components for decision making. Dupont et al. [108] have developed one such platform (called Cloud4IoT) for performing horizontal (roaming) and vertical (offloading) migration of IoT functions using a three-tier (cloud, edge and IoT gateways) Kubernetes cluster. In another work, Carella et al. [109] presented an architecture based on the Open Baton Management and Orchestration (MANO) framework combining different infrastructural technologies supporting deployment of container-based network services even at the edge of network [109] .
Containers in Other Applications: Wu et al. [20] adopted containerization to track full motion videos by partitioning the video stream into frames and dynamically allocating them (optimizing computing resources) to various containers depending on frame production and available resources for processing. Jimenez et al. [22] showcased the use of containers for reproducibility (in terms of workload, system and result) of research outcomes, by creating experiment-specific execution profiles that focuses on local and distributed storage. According to Saez et al. [23] container-based virtualization can be a perfect solution for rapid and efficient building of middle-ware instances that are extremely lightweight and optimally configured. Containers are excellent tools for cloudifying the existing middlewares and making them as part of larger PaaS offerings and hence, the authors devised a dynamic tailoring and deployment process for service middleware solution in the form of Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) geared towards cloud environments.
VIII. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND FUTURE TRENDS
Few challenges resisting containerization from gaining desired rapid momentum are as follows:
A. COMPLEX NETWORKING Containers are often created and destroyed on demand for better scalability. This leads to the following problems:
Problems may occur due to the inability of using IP-address as unique identifier during large scale container deployment that could have a good possibility of assignment of same IP-address to multiple container instances. Log maintenance could be much harder with non-unique IP-addresses.
IP-address assignment during large scale container deployment remains a big challenge due to constant risk of IP collision during simultaneous requests. This could often make log maintenance tougher. Possible solution could be creating containers within VM and allocating unique identifier, combining VM IP-address with container port number, to each container [12] .
Containers often use NAT for network connectivity that can make troubleshooting difficult for large scale implementations. NAT usage can be avoided by directly attaching containers to host network interfaces by sharing LAN and obtaining IP-addresses from its DHCP server or providing with static LAN address. NAT can also be avoided by turning host machine into a virtual router which can route a prefix to the containers thereby using IP-address as a unique identifiers for containers. Although, this configuration offers less complexity, it may compromise security as all the Layer 4 ports gets exposed. Moreover, as the number of containers in rack increases, the number of MAC addresses in Layer 2 forwarding table of Top of the Rack (ToR) also increases, which may hamper traffic switching.
B. COMPLEX ORCHESTRATION & MANAGEMENT
Despite several innovative advancement, container orchestration still needs further research in the following challenges: 1) MONITORING, PROFILING AND CHARACTERIZATION [40] Container monitoring includes monitoring of container ecosystem and container engine/platform. Monitoring tools and techniques for OS and application levels do not allow wide range of QoS and health state metrics for containers. Above all, there is no unanimously agreed definition of QoS metrics for container environment. Docker offers ''docker stat'' command to check CPU and memory utilization for each running container.
2) PERFORMANCE MODELS [40] There is a desperate need of efficient performance validation and energy consumption models for distributed containerized applications, which should be included in the modern orchestrators for better container management. Performance models are widely used in autonomic computing as representation of the system that must be adapted and as a tool to determine the reconfiguration actions needed to maintain the desired level of service. An alternative approach is the use of machine learning techniques to determine the more appropriate reconfiguration action.
3) ADAPTATION MODELS FOR CONTAINER ORCHESTRATION [40] Industry needs a robust container orchestration framework for QoS-aware, energy-aware and legislation-aware optimal adaptation for container orchestration. This framework define system models, QoS, energy and legal constraints, to find optimal adaptation policies for container orchestration at run time.
Apart from them, few other challenges regarding container deployment and orchestration are as follows:
4) COMPLEX LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT
This is a real problem during stateful container deployment and orchestration. This is because, more often than not, stateful distributed services can have complex deployment steps with multiple dependencies (for example: kubernetes deployment has 21 steps). Moreover, the orchestration operators have to manage orchestrator in real time and also have to take care about various upgrades, failures, configuration changes, scaling, etc.
5) RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
Deploying multiple distributed systems often results in sub-optimal resource utilization.
6) MULTITENANCY
Multitenancy becomes much harder with inclusion of multiple tenants with their own requirements and isolation & security because of the specific questions as follows:
It is very to monitor monitor/resist any specific tenant from hijacking huge resources of a cluster, which might influence the performance of other co-located tenants.
It is also hard to be sure about a specific tenant not breaching the privacy of other colocated instances.
C. PERSISTENT STORAGE
Persistent storage can be viewed as storage volume that remains available beyond specific container life.
Persistent Storage problem for container points to the inability of stateless containers to act like stateful applications regarding persistent storage (like database) due to their extremely short life-span. Again, providing a huge and complex stack of storage may introduce contentions, which, in turn, may hamper the lightweight feature of containerization and, hence, issue regarding persistent storage remains [73] . Container storage requires efficient data mobility, enhanced data security and optimal performance. Shared storage was once considered to be a possible solution, but with the increase of public, federated cloud and considering ephemeral lifetime of containers, the strategy got lost in time. Automated mapping of Logical Unit Number (number for identifying a logical unit or a device addressed by (SAN) protocols [110] ) and volumes on physical arrays to physical hosts and to finally individual container evolves as one possible solution (example: IBM Docker Volume plug-ins enable persistent storage and retrieval of a resource within a container). Another possible solution is to use containers themselves as the storage platforms (also called storage containers [111] ) as the communication path between the application and the storage will become very light-weight (it will be a simple communication between to processes) due to the elimination of I/O stack. But there are still issues with these solutions, e.g., a data volume cannot be attached to new spin up container or existing running container and hence, the resources that volume consumes are not utilized, which may not be an optimum solution. Moreover, this voids the basic containerization principle of being lightweight.
Persistent Storage Management Problem: Containers are often created and destroyed and it would often be difficult to keep track of the data under use. Hence, for containerization without hampering data access ability the challenges faced by current industries are to build parallel systems for various stateful applications like legacy codes, databases, and information systems. Legacy architectures are often found complex with extremely low API support, hence, desperately needed persistent storage facility for successful containerization.
Data Transfer Problem: Lack of persistent storage utilities within containerization may increase difficulties during secure data transfer between locations or even in clouds. This problem increases because of unavailability of powerful tools and platforms that provide infinite scalability, significantly high performance, security and complete application control.
Time & Money: Industries cannot replace their important and invaluable legacy applications overnight with containerizations as it requires huge time and money. Consequences after replacing with containers can even be costlier than continuing with legacy applications.
D. CROSS DATA CENTER OR MULTI-CLOUD SUPPORT
It is essential for edge clouds provisioning and can be classified based on their architecture [112] : multi-data center clouds consisting multiple tightly coupled data centers run by a single cloud provider entity; multi-service clouds combining loosely coupled services from different cloud providers; and distributed edge clouds providing edge resources in a highly dispersed manner. Running containers across multiple clouds encounters challenges like location-awareness; replication; container scheduling and placement; dynamic and flexible adaptation; resource discovery and coordination; and service container mobility across multiple vendors. Edge cloud provides a localized view and hence, attributes like location awareness, low latency and mobility support are stringent for managing cloud end points with ample virtualized resources [113] .
Edge cloud [114] can be deployed a virtualized infrastructure called micro-clouds [115] that can provide different services but on a small scale and a seamless data transfer between these micro-clouds to provide an appropriate enduser access [113] . Combination of micro-clouds and a centralized cloud architecture can suffice all issues mentioned above as well as provides quick access to the services and faster fault tolerance. Such multi-clouds (cloud of clouds) architectures [116] , [117] , reduces possibilities of outage, security threats, loss of control and data systems, vendor lockin and provides high availability, high reliability, flexibility and easy scalability [116] .
Hybrid Deployment Problem: Multi-cloud deployments faces issues like conflicting hybrid cloud architectures, vendor-specific devices and complex management. Cloud providers try to solve these problems for their specific clouds whereas, service providers fix the problems pertaining to their services only. Thus, multi-cloud environments result in incompatible APIs, different dashboards and siloed monitoring-all adding up to inconsistent or poor visibility within hybrid system.
Consolidated Monitoring Solution: Multi-Cloud environment consists of multiple monitoring and management solutions for each individual cloud. For instance, if a multicloud comprises of AWS, Azure and oogle Cloud Platform then, each individual environment has its own dashboard and set of APIs for monitoring and management, but there is no provision for centralized monitoring of all the three individual clouds. Thus, one possible solution is to implement a consistent data store to gather, analyze and operate on multiple metrics and events that are generated from countless containers and applications running on them. As each container and service writes its event or metrics data to a consistent API, a consolidated monitoring solution can be achieved.
E. FUTURE TREND
OS-virtualization is continuously gaining importance, however, it frequently adds layers of indirection and abstraction beneath the application code to an already densely-layered software stack that includes supports for legacy physical protocols; irrelevant optimization (like: disk elevator algorithms on SSD drives); backward compatible interfaces; user-space processes and threads; and managed-code run times. The situation will continue to become extremely critical in coming years if the inclusion of extra layers maintains current pace (due to the scattered presence of logic across different software components, written in different languages), as future programmers need to dig through thousands of layers for debugging even simplest applications.
Unikernels: MirageOS (unikernel stack built in OCaml) aims to unify these diverse interfaces-both kernel and user application spaces-into a single high-level language framework. MirageOS allows all software layers of a virtual appliance to be complied within the same high level language framework instead of dynamically assembling them on every boot. Mirage (contributes a suit of type-safe protocol libs) dubbed Unikernel and restructures all kernel and userspace code into more flexible, secure and reusable modular components following legacy libOS style [67] . Unikernels are light-weight (size of few MBs), compact, single address space, memory safe, single-purpose appliances (VMs) that are compile-time specialized into standalone kernels, and sealed against modification when deployed to a cloud platform. In return they offer significant reduction in image sizes, improved efficiency and security, and should reduce operational costs [67] , [118] . For example, no OS facilities for device drivers are included in the final production image of the application that does not require persistent disk access. Network latency remains a prominent problem for all cloud service. One of the ways to handle it is moving computations out of remote datacenters by rapidly instantiating local services near the user. It requires an embedded cloud platform on which to deploy multiple applications securely and quickly. In an Unikernel edge computing application, Jitsu satisfies the demands of secure multi-tenant isolation on resource-constrained embedded ARM devices [119] . Using fast shared memory channels, Jitsu provides a directory service that launches Unikernels in response to network traffic and masks boot latency. In other IoT edge offloading architecture, Cozzolino et al. [120] have utilized MirageOS unikernels to isolate and embed application logic in concise Xen-bootable images. Motifs behind adopting Unikernel in [120] are respectively the single purpose task without offloading full application and better security. Other application of Unikernels in Content Delivery Network (CDN) is found in [121] . Unikernels provide better security and isolation than their light-weight counterpart containers and in many cases they efficiently provide essential features like extremely small disk-and memory footprints, microscopic spin up/down times, efficient asynchronous I/O, OS-library that includes only what service needs [122] . However, upgraded security and isolation along with further reduction in booting time and complexity of Unikernels can be achieved using Unikernel monitors [123] , where Unikernel is bundled with a tiny, specialized monitor that only contains required interfaces and implementation resources for the Unikernel. Few important approaches for constructing Unikernel are ClickOS (boots under 30ms) and LING (boots under 100ms) with speed as focus; MirageOS and HalVM with focus as safety and security; Rump Kernels and OS v with focus as compatibility with legacy software; Unikernel Linux for handling massive range of Linux conditions [124] ; Micropython unikernel has image size 1MB and needs 8MB of memory to run, whereas Xen hypervisor based VM images might often lie between 1.5 to 3 GBs.
Microkernels: History of microkernels started around 1980's because of storage limitation of early computers. Microkernels are minimalistic kernels that include primitives such as basic system IPC protocols (for providing mechanism for kernel-controlled change of execution flow, data transfer and resource delegation between potentially disturbing multi-party protection domains), memory management functionality necessary to run an OS, whereas every other utility is loaded in user mode (during user logging in). In other way, here the prime goal is to minimize kernel code and outsource various utilities to user space. In this way it reduces the code complexity, disk and memory footprints but at the cost of reduction in essential security mechanisms within kernel space. On contrary, VMMs closely resemble processor hardware and offer a rich variety of primitives, each of which require dedicated set of security mechanisms, resources and kernel code [125] . General VMM primitives are synchronous switch of protection domains from guest users to guest kernel and vice versa; asynchronous communication channels across domains; resource allocation within VMs; resource allocation per VM; resource reallocation; page fault and exception handling; cross-domain asynchronous event modification; hardware interrupt modification; and a set of common devices. Microkernels aim to provide minimal layer of privileged software, while VMMs rely on replicating and multiplexing hardware resources [126] . Modern VMMs are increasingly becoming more microkernel-like by outsourcing drivers to user-space for providing better legacy code support and reducing attack surface. On contrary, microkernels also support virtualization for providing better support for legacy software [126] . Unlike unikernels, microkernels support multiple applications which are protected from each other through hardware and software firewalls [127] . Some popular microkernels are F9 (constructing power-efficient and securitysensitive real-time and embedded systems for ARM Cortex M series); Genode (toolkit for building highly secured special purpose OS); HelenOS; M3 (aiming to support arbitrary cores), SeL4 (high assurance and high performance microkernels), etc.
Although, unikernel and microkernel both provide lightweight functionality, microkernels can be a bit slower than its counterpart due to the messages passing mechanism between user and kernel-spaces. Moreover, microkernel has relatively larger memory footprints; they may suffer from performance degradation due to message passing between user and kernel spaces; and overall process management can be more complex than unikernels.
LightVMs: In general, lightweight VMs are unable to ensure good performance as virtualization control plane becomes the performance bottleneck. LightVMs [128] , [129] , using paravirtualization (providing VM-like isolation & security and container-like performance) can also provide solution for the challenges such as: improving isolation & security, improving booting time and educing disk and memory footprints. In LightVMs redesign Xen's centralized control plane to a distributed one and significantly minimizes the interaction with hypervisor. LightVMs are compatible with Linux fork/exec and often found showing faster booting time than Docker. LightVM can pack and run large numbers of lightweight guests on a modest hardware platform. LightVMs in combination with application-level virtualization can achieve resource adaptation in middleware especially for soft real-time applications using both resource managers (multiplex or map high-level resources on top of low-level resources) and resource schedulers (manages processing resources such as threads or virtual processors) operating at higher (virtual memory, network connection, team of threads, etc.) and lower-levels (physical resources like CPU, memory and network) [130] .
Other Approaches: Kata containers, Clear containers, Photon OS and Hyper are well accepted lightweight virtualization mechanisms by cloud computing communities and industries [131] . Kata container initiative is an open source project managed by OpenStack Foundation that combines Intel's Clear container and HyperV's runV to run one container per compatible with OCI specifications similar to Docker [132] . Kata containers being currently in formation stages can be a next-gen virtualization technique as it offers speed of containers and security of VMs providing compatibility with major cloud platforms like with major cloud platforms like OpenStack, Google Cloud Platform and Azure. Immutable server is considered to be a deployment model that carefully endorses any application update, security patch, configuration change done to specific production system and, every time a new image is constructed, pushed and cycled to production, if, in case, any of the layers requires modifications. The advantage of this approach includes higher code confidence during production.
IX. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS OF HYPERVISOR AND LIGHTWEIGHT VIRTUALIZATION
This section presents a performance comparison (in terms of throughput, bandwidth and network bandwidth) of container with that of native system, unikernels and VMs, while one or more system resources are fully utilized. For that, we used five standard benchmarks called RandomAccess (measures Giga Updates/sec or GUPS); SysBench (CPU performance) Linpack (numerically intensive test for measuring system's floating point performance); Iperf (for checking network bandwidth) and STREAM (measures sustained bandwidth of entire cache hierarchy). Experimental verification were done using HP-Blade server with 64 bit Ubuntu16:04, kernel 4.4, Intel Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 2.6 GHz (64 cores), RAM 128GB, 5.4TB SSD. Base image for Docker (v18.06.1-ce) and LXC/LXD (v2.0.11) is Ubuntu16:04. We choose tiny OS v and Rumprun VMs (size around 5 MBs) on top of Xen and kvm as unikernel representatives with extremely fast booting time and with negligible delay. Ubuntu16:04 within Xen is used as VM representative for the current experiment.
This section extends the work of Felter et al. [133] by extending the performance comparisons among containers (LXC/LXD, Docker, rkt), VMs (using Ubuntu16:04 VMs on top of Xen, kvm), and unikernels (OS v , Rumprun using Rump kernel contains a heavily-reduced version of NetBSD [124] ) using standard benchmarks called RandomAccess (random memory access), SysBench (CPU performance), LINPACK (floating point rate of execution), Iperf (network bandwidth), and STREAM (measuring memory bandwidth). We have also identified primary performance impact of several instances of different virtualization appliances. During above experiments, power management was disabled using performance cpufreq governor. Docker and LXC/LXD containers were not restricted by cgroups so they could consume full system resources. They are configured with 64 vCPUs and 32 GB RAM for these experiments. We use microbenchmarks to measure CPU, memory, network, and storage overheads. Next, we fix strategies to make our experiments robust.
A. EXPERIMENT STRATEGY (ES)
We conducted experiments following two ways below:
ES1: Monitoring performance of single instance (utilizing available system resources) of each of the virtual appliances at a particular time slice by running individual benchmark.
ES2: Running individual benchmark simultaneously in multiple instances of each of the virtual appliances. This experiment is to show if all available channelized to a specific instance, still it can offer near native performance. For this experiment, we took 100 instances for each item.
We have conducted both ES1 and ES2 experiments 100 times and results are presented next.
B. RandomAccess
It is used to calculate peak capabilities of memory systems/sub-systems (like GUPS rating of a distributed memory multiprocessor, an SMP node, and that of a single processor), where GUPS is random memory access performance measurement that profiles system memory architecture. It initializes a large section of memory as its working set that is larger than caches or TLB.
Random 8-byte words in this memory section are read, modified and dumped back. Random locations are produced using a linear feedback shift register requiring no memory operations. Hence, there is no dependency between successive operations permitting multiple independent operations to be in flight through the system.
RandomAccess typifies the behavior of workloads with large working sets and minimal computation such as those with in-memory hash tables and in-memory databases. RandomAccess uses large pages to reduce TLB miss overhead. Due to its random memory access pattern and a working set that is larger than the TLB reach, RandomAccess significantly exercises the hardware page table walker that handles TLB misses. Fig. 2 shows Docker and OS v have achieved near-native GUPS performance, whereas LXC/LXD staged with next best GUPS performance. kvm with Ubuntu16:04 showed the weakest GUPS performance for ES1 experimental strategies. Results are slightly different for ES2 strategy, where Docker, LXC/LXD and OS v outperform kvm (see Fig. 3 and Table 5 ). Though kvm is found offering relatively weaker GUPS performance in the pictorial representations, but in reality all virtualization appliances impose negligible overhead on memory usage.
Another experiment relating container performance focusing GUPS fluctuations with variable global . Here, n is the largest power of 2, which is less than or equal to the half of main memory size. In short, we have to perform ⊕ between a specific 64 bit integer T[i] and another integer A[i] taken from the stream and will store the result back to the location T[i] and have to monitor corresponding GUPS fluctuations by changing the vector, chunk sizes simultaneously (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 ). GUPS performance decreases for smaller chunk sizes (see Fig. 5 ).
With our detailed experiments with RandomAccess benchmark, it can be concluded that container instances (Docker and LXC/LXD, in the current study) can also provide near real-time performances and hence, will be helpful for modern cloud industries from random access performance measurement point of view. However, for further investigations, we also worked on other benchmarks in subsequent subsections.
C. CPU PERFORMANCE-SysBench
We used SysBench benchmark's CPU [134] test for checking CPU performance for native and other virtual appliances (Docker, OSv, Rumprun, rkt, LXC/LXD, kvm, Xen) using a maximum prime number, which the test run TABLE 5. Performance evaluation of different lightweight virtual appliances and VMs sing popular benchmarks such as STREAM and LINPACK. The experimented were conducted following both ES1 (using single instance of a virtual appliance) and ES2 (employing multiple instances of a specific virtual appliance, columns are highlighted blue) strategies. Detailed analysis of the experimental results are presented in Section IX-E and Section IX-F. Here, ''No.'' implies the number of instance(s) of a specific virtual appliance running during an experiment. x-axis: number of virtual appliances running on the underlying hardware, and y -axis: data transfer rate (MB/sec).
FIGURE 4.
Relation between GUPS (y -axis) and vector size (x-axis) of host, Docker, LXC/LXD, OS v . and kvm instances. Docker and OS v . offer near real-time performance, whereas kvm shows fluctuations in its performance. It shows the increment in GUPS with reduction in vector size. Opposite pattern can be found in the relation between GUPS and chunk size for the current experiment.
to determine the time required for calculating it. Number of threads (default 1) can be specified during the test. For multithreaded CPU with 64 cores, true CPU performance judgment can be done using 64 threads. In the current experiment, we have allocated 8 CPU cores to each virtual appliances. Hence, we have varied the number of threads among 1, 2, 4, 8 using command ''for each in 1 2 4 8; do sysbench --test=cpu-max-prime=2000 --num-threads=$each run; done'' and the detailed results are shown in Table 6 . It shows the Docker performance was nearer to that of the native system for ES1 strategy, whereas performance significantly drops down in ES2 strategy. However, kvm and Xen show very consistent performance in both the strategies. OSv offers the worst performance among the used virtual appliances. However, the performance of other unikernel based virtual appliance, called Rumprun was found offering unsatisfactory performance, even inferior to FIGURE 5. Relation between GUPS (fluctuate between 0.005 to 0.35) and chunk sizes (varying among 10, 100, 1000, 10000 , represented using bars) for host, Docker, LXC/LXD, OS v . and kvm instances. This experiment has been repeated for 100 times (11 are reported here) with native system, and other virtual appliances (ES1). GUPS decreases with smaller chunk sizes. kvm and Xen. Though the results are very system specific, but still, on the basis of the conducted experiments, it can be confirmed VMs to show consistent performance (see Table 6 , related rows are highlighted green), however, containers can also offer good performance. Unikernels are very promising, probably, by combining the best of VMs and containers for providing lightweight and secure virtualization but still need research for providing stable and steady performance throughout. Same conclusion can be drawn for containers as they show fluctuations in execution times between ES1 and ES2 strategies.
D. NETWORK BANDWIDTH-Iperf
We used Iperf2 [135] , network benchmarking tool for measuring and comparing network bandwidth of containers (Docker, rkt), unikernels (OS v , Rumprun), and VMs (kvm). in each case, we have tested with two instances (one acting as server and the other as client), where containers use default bridges, whereas unikernels and VMs on hypervisor were bridged using tap interface. Performance of Docker, rkt, OSv were found more promising than that of kvm. However, kvm performance can be improved by replacing tap bridge with user space virtual switches like OSV/DPDK and VOSYSwitch.
E. MEMORY BANDWIDTH-STREAM
STREAM benchmark [136] stresses memory subsystem in a consistent fashion, permitting hardware pre-fetchers to bring in data from memory before they are used computation. Performance is dominated by system memory bandwidth, where created working set is significantly larger than cache size. Main performance determinants are main memory bandwidth and cost of handling TLB misses (to a lesser extent), which can be handled by using pages of large size. Memory access pattern is regular and hardware pre-fetchers typically latch on to the access pattern and pre-fetch data before it is needed. Performance is therefore gated by memory bandwidth and not latency. This benchmark has four operating modes: COPY, SCALE, ADD and TRIAD that are described in Table 5 with detailed results during current experimentation. Among these four modes, ADD, SCALE and TRIAD are heavily relied on CPU for arithmetic computations before writing the data to memory. On contrary, COPY measures transfer rate without doing any further arithmetic operation before writing data to memory. For this experiment, STREAM benchmark was built without ''-fopenmp'' flag because of the lack of OpenMP lib support available in OS v . We also used default single thread for this experimentation with different virtual instances of containers (Docker, rkt), VMs (different Xen and kvm configurations) and unikernels (OS v and Rumprun). We have varied the number of instances of virtual appliances between 1-10 (column highlighted blue in Table 5 ) and each instance was run for 10 times. Experimental results point to consistently near real time performance by Docker, rkt, LXC/LXD, Rumprun, and different configurations of kvm and Xen (see Table 5 ). An interesting point from Table 5 is that kvm with VirtIO performs slightly inferior than kvm without VirtIO during COPY operation (columns highlighted in green and yellow respectively in Table 5 ). VirtIO drivers are responsible for providing more paravirtualized methods of accessing disk blocks and network devices and hence, in its presence kvm is expected to perform better than that without the assistance of paravirtualized interface. This maybe, due to the presence of different disk caching modes (off, write through, write back) within kvm, each of which perform differently under different operating conditions. Other reason could be, kvm uses copy-on-write disk files, which might affect virtual disk performance on write operation than Xen raw image files. Detailed visualization of experimental results pictorially shown in Fig. 6 .
F. FLOATING POINT RATE OF EXECUTION-Linpack
Next, we have to see CPU performance for both system and containers (Docker and LXC/LXD in the current case) using Linpack benchmarking [137] , [138] . LINPACK solves a dense system of linear equations whose matrices are general, banded, symmetric indefinite, symmetric positive definite, triangular, and tridiagonal square. In addition, the package computes the QR and singular value decompositions of rectangular matrices and applies them to least-squares problems. LINPACK uses column-oriented algorithms to increase efficiency by preserving locality of reference [138] . Most of compute operations use double-precision floating point multiplication of a scalar with a vector and adding results to another vector (see Table 5 ). This benchmark is typically based on a linear algebra library that is heavily optimized for specific machine architecture at hand.
We use an optimized LINPACK binary (v11.1.2.005) based on Intel Math Kernel Library (MKL) with a problem size of 500 × 500. Intel MKL is highly adaptive and optimizes itself based on both the available floating point resources (e.g., what form of multimedia operations are available), as well as system cache topology.
G. SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL OUTCOMES & DISCUSSIONS
Modern virtual appliances (both heavier hypervisors and lightweight tools) have gained significant performance maturity from the research work of virtualization, hardware and software optimization, started around half a century ago [133] . Despite remarkable improvements, containers and unikernels are found outperforming their VM counterparts in most of the experiments. For example, random memory access performance of Docker, LXC and OS v . (unikernel) is found better than that of kvm. On contrary, Docker fails to provide stable CPU performance (using SysBench) with increasing number of Docker instances running on the same underlying hardware (ES2). Unikernels (OS v . and Rumprun) show worst performance in this case and it further FIGURE 6. Performance analysis using STREAM benchmark: for COPY, the performance of Xen+HVM looked relatively unstable and inferior than other virtual appliances only expect OS v . Other appliances show stable performance and Rumprun emerged as best performer for COPY operation. For SCALE, Rumprun offered the best performance and it became better with increasing number of running Rumprun instances in the underlying hardware, whereas OS v . was the consistent worst performer. Other appliances showed stable and near real-time performance. All virtual appliances offered stable and near real-time performance for ADD operation, though OS v .'s performance was slightly inferior than others. For TRIAD, all appliances showed fluctuations in their performances. deteriorates with increasing number of running collocated instances. Docker, rkt, and OS v . offer better network bandwidth using Iperf benchmark. For COPY, SCALE, ADD and TRIAD OS v . shows the worst performance, whereas containers and Rumprun show best performance for COPY, SCALE and ADD; VMs and containers show stable performance throughout and for Triad VMs show the best performance. In short, unikernel performance fluctuates often, whereas that of the VMs is found most stable among all. Containerization provides near real-time, good resource utilization as it harnesses the virtues of virtualization for aggregating more applications on one system at the same time avoiding additional overheads (in terms of bigger memory footprints, slower spin up/down and deployment) cast by VMs. However, LightVMs (recent development in VM research) are able to neutralize previous VM weaknesses and additionally provide strong isolation.
Unikernels, on the other hand, offer promising features such as significantly reduced memory footprint, fast booting, VM-like security, efficient resource utilization, I/O performance and many more. Unlike containers, unikernels do not require general purpose OS like Linux, instead single purpose OS. Unikernel groups OS functionality necessary to run a specific application along with the application and allows the group to act and live independently. Hence, each unikernel has its own kernel, whereas the containers on a host have to share a kernel (and have root access too) that may often found as the reason behind falling whole containerized data center to adversarial control through a single point of failure. Unikernels offer important advantages for some specific cases like IoT, where processing power and storage facilities are relatively scarce. Unikernels operate only in privileged mode and cannot be logged in remotely, which significantly eliminates the number of Linux system attack vectors like shell code exploits. Well-known vulnerabilities and ransomeware from recent past like Equifax and SamSam respectively, were failed to hurt unikernel systems as these styles of attacks were foreign to the unikernel environment. However, unikernels are still lagged behind research in many key aspects including process containment, microprocessor stability, virtualization [124] .
Hence, to continue with a steady growth in industrial applications, containerization has to provide advantages other than steady state performance, faster booting, lightweight virtualization and must have to focus on the following issues as the combination of convenience, faster and easier deployment, elasticity (cross platform support and availability of capable tools), and performance is believed to be significantly compelling in the near future:
Lack of Cross-Platform Supports: Different containers do not support other platforms. For example, OpenShift only works with kubernetes orchestrator.
Lack of Persistent Storage Supports: All data inside containers permanently disappear upon shutting down the specific container instance unless they are not saved in some other storage volumes. There are few existing ways to save data persistently in Docker like Docker Data Volumes that yet needs certain level of maturity and has to be implemented in more seamless way.
N ot fit for all Services: Applications, implemented as microservices are the better fit for containerizations. For other services, supporting monolithic architecture, containerization only offers simplified delivery mechanism by providing easy packaging techniques.
Speed Inferior to Bare-Metal: Containers are more efficient in resource utilization than VMs but are still subject to delay because of overlay networking, interfacing between host and containers, etc.
Weaker Isolation: Container isolation mechanism is much weaker than that of VMs and unikernels. This is due to the kernel sharing that may lead to collapse of entire containerized environment through a single exploitable channel (single point of failure). This situation can be handled by running containers in a VM as, even though, the containers within VM are compromised, the vulnerability will not extend outside the VM, which limits the scope of potential damage.
Handling Dependencies: Containers have to handle multiple dependencies as they do not contain full general purpose OS. In contrast VMs are more self-contained.
Lack of Tools and Supports: Containerizations still need capable tools for monitoring and managing containers in real-time. However, with new tools like Kubernetes container management becomes bit easier.
Container Sprawl: Container life-cycle management remains critical as containers can be spun up and duplicated at remarkable rate. This could be considered as an important advantage if the unwanted container instances are deleted in regular intervals. However, this could create serious scaling issues and might lead to impose significant cloud computing costs if unwanted instances are not deleted regularly.
Container Portability Limitations: Porting containers from one family of OSs (say Linux) to another family (say Windows) is more complex than the porting of VMs. Additionally, a containerized Linux application needs Linux host, which is not necessary for VMs. Hence, containers are less portable in this context. Also, it is extremely hard to get container support for macOS as traditional containerization mainly supports Linux and Windows platforms. Hence, there is no native way available to deploy Dockerized applications on macOS. However, this problem can be solved using a relatively costly (in terms of higher resource utilization and complex management) technique of employing Linux-based VM as middleman between macOS and Dockerized application However, in recent years, a new set of tools for Docker called, ''LinuxKit'' allows developers to create Linux subsystem within containers that provides a tiny Linux-based OS, which runs inside a container and helps Docker container to run on different types of OS. This facility is not available for other container technologies. LinuxKit is only applicable for Linux-based applications in Docker platform and till date, no similar tool exists for Windows-based applications.
X. CONCLUSION
The present study talks about several promising aspects of containerizations with detailed technicalities involved in their successful industrial implementation, security & isolation, smooth management and orchestration. In short, containerization provides many promising features like super lightweight, faster spin-up/down, efficient energy and resource utilization, impressive workload distribution capabilities, achieving server consolidation, and many more, but at the same time it has few major problems such as weaker isolation, higher chance of container sprawl, lack of capable tools for container orchestration and cross-platform supports and container portability limitations. On the other hand, VMs provide strong isolation, it has a reach set of available tools to provide cross-platform supports and management, offer better portability than containers though bigger memory footprints and slow booting remain their major issues. Unikernels provide VM-like isolation with significantly small footprints along with extremely fast booting. However, lack of efficient management and cross-platform supportive tools, unavailability of persistent storage facility, microprocessor stability and process containment remain their major problems.
However, with the recent technological developments in both VMs and lightweight virtualizations, the increasing industrial acceptance of containerization will soon be challenged as the need of the day has shifted to the advantages other than steady state performance, faster booting, lightweight virtualization as the combination of convenience, faster and steady deployment, elasticity and performance is strongly believed to be extremely compelling in foreseeable future. Hence, to maintain its wide-spread industrial acceptance, containerization must have to focus on the following important issues like: development of tools and techniques to make container isolation stronger; development of tools for efficient container management and orchestration (although kubernetes is already emerged to be an efficient one); development of tools for improving portability and cross-platform support; development of tools to provide persistent storage facilities for hosted applications.
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